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14 <H1>[IRCServices] Suggestion</H1>
15 <B>Mark Hetherington</B>
16 <A HREF="mailto:ircservices%40ircservices.za.net?Subject=%5BIRCServices%5D%20Suggestion&In-Reply-To=3ab53607.41755%40prima-lan.net"
17 TITLE="[IRCServices] Suggestion">markh at eurodltd.co.uk
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19 <I>Tue Mar 20 19:14:04 PST 2001</I>
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34 <PRE>&gt;<i> &gt;&gt; Since users having their passwords taken almost
35 </I>&gt;<i> certainly means they
36 </I>&gt;<i> &gt;&gt; chose an easy-to-guess password, the right solution is to
37 </I>&gt;<i> educate the
38 </I>&gt;<i> &gt;&gt; users. I don't see why Services should have to run
39 </I>&gt;<i> through hoops to try
40 </I>&gt;<i> &gt;&gt; and solve this problem. (Of course, if your server is being
41 </I>&gt;<i> &gt;&gt; packet-sniffed, then you have other problems altogether.)
42 </I>&gt;<i> &gt;
43 </I>&gt;<i> &gt;This is correct, but you also have to see, that passwords
44 </I>&gt;<i> are &quot;guessed&quot;
45 </I>&gt;<i> &gt;via scripts, which use sockets (mirc has socket events e.g.)
46 </I>&gt;<i> And start a
47 </I>&gt;<i> &gt;good amount of connects, each with 3 nick password guesses,
48 </I>&gt;<i> sure it takes
49 </I>&gt;<i> &gt;time on good passwords, but sometimes users simply cannot
50 </I>&gt;<i> stop themselves
51 </I>&gt;<i> &gt;from setting the cellular phone number as their password, su
52 </I>&gt;<i> suddenly it
53 </I>&gt;<i> &gt;gets limited to numbers only etc, etc.
54 </I>&gt;<i>
55 </I>&gt;<i> Hm, that's a good point. Looks like I need a better way
56 </I>&gt;<i> to detect
57 </I>&gt;<i> password guessers.
58 </I>
59 Maybe emulate the system used for Car radios etc. After the first failure of
60 3 &quot;suspend&quot; the nickname for 1 hour, then 2 hours then 4 hours etc until it
61 is ultimately locked out entirely and an admin has to take steps to restore
62 the nickname to the user after sufficient authentication.
63
64 &gt;<i>
65 </I>&gt;<i> &gt;Each time a nickname is registered, a nick gets an
66 </I>&gt;<i> authentication code, a
67 </I>&gt;<i> &gt;la dalnet, which cannot be changed, and which is not shown.
68 </I>&gt;<i> Thi code is
69 </I>&gt;<i> &gt;emailed to the address given with the register command.
70 </I>&gt;<i> After that, the
71 </I>&gt;<i> &gt;person has to issue /nickserv AUTH &lt;code&gt; within some
72 </I>&gt;<i> services.conf days,
73 </I>&gt;<i> &gt;or the registration will expire. If people claim to have lost their
74 </I>&gt;<i> &gt;passwords, but can prove that they have the authentication
75 </I>&gt;<i> code, because
76 </I>&gt;<i> &gt;it was emailed to them, a services oper can issue /nickserv
77 </I>&gt;<i> GETAUTH nick,
78 </I>&gt;<i> &gt;and check the real authentication code against the given, if
79 </I>&gt;<i> they match,
80 </I>&gt;<i> &gt;it is highly possible that the person is the real owner, so
81 </I>&gt;<i> &gt;sendpass/getpass can be issued.
82 </I>&gt;<i>
83 </I>&gt;<i> While this is a good idea if you want to ensure
84 </I>&gt;<i> accountability of your
85 </I>&gt;<i> users, I don't see how it solves the problem of E-mail addresses being
86 </I>&gt;<i> changed after registration. On the other hand, if this is
87 </I>&gt;<i> applied to SET
88 </I>&gt;<i> EMAIL as well, you can avoid that problem; but then you have
89 </I>&gt;<i> to deal with
90 </I>&gt;<i> people who can't use their old address and distinguishing them from
91 </I>&gt;<i> crackers who guessed the password and want to steal the nick.
92 </I>
93 Is this or a similar authentication system likely to be in a future version
94 of services? It is a system I would like to see since if nothing else it
95 reduces the registrations &quot;made on a whim&quot; when the process is more work
96 than /ns register pass.
97
98 If not, would Yusuf care to share his &quot;patch&quot; with others?
99
100 Mark Hetherington.
101 CTCP Networks.
102
103
104
105 </PRE>
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